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A b s tra c t. Formal methods have been applied frequently to analyze 
(critical parts of) standards for communication protocols and it has been 
demonstrated that their application may help to improve the quality of 
these standards. Nevertheless, despite several decades of formal meth­
ods research, formal methods notations have rarely been included in the 
authoritative part of protocol standards. Also, the relationships between 
(abstract) formal models and informal protocol standards are typically 
obscure. It is our ambition to improve this situation. To establish the 
current state-of-the-art, we report in this paper on a case study in which 
UPPAAL is used to formally model parts of Zeroconf, a protocol for dy­
namic configuration of IPv4 link-local addresses that has been defined in 
RFC 3927 of the IETF. Our goal has been to construct a model that (a) 
is easy to understand by engineers, (b) comes as close as possible to the 
informal text (for each transition in the model there should be a corre­
sponding piece of text in the RFC), and (c) may serve as a basis for formal 
verification. Our conclusion is that UPPAAL, which combines extended 
finite state machines, C-like syntax and concepts from timed automata 
theory, is able to model Zeroconf in a faithful and intuitive manner, using 
notations that are familiar to protocol engineers. Our modeling efforts 
revealed several errors (or at least ambiguities) in the RFC that no one 
else spotted before. We also identify a number of points where UPPAAL 
still can be improved. After applying a number of abstractions, UPPAAL 
is able to fully explore the state space of an instance of our model with 
three hosts, and to establish some correctness properties.
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Project IST-2001-35304 Advanced Methods for Timed Systems (AMETIST), 
h t tp : / /a m e tis t .c s .u tw e n te .n l , and the DFG/NWO bilateral cooperation project 
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21 In trodu ction
O ur society increasingly depends on the correct functioning of m odern com­
m unication technology. M ost prom inent are (mobile) phones and Internet, bu t 
there are also networks in m odern cars, trains, and airplanes, and the new gen­
eration of consum er electronics allows all sorts of devices to  com m unicate w ith 
each other. The m ost im portan t and m ost often used protocols th a t describe the 
operation of these networks are standardized. Exam ples of th is are the In ternet 
protocol (T C P /IP ) and all its derivatives, F ireW ire/iL ink (IEEE 1394), HAVi, 
W AP and BlueTooth. Due to  a com bination of factors, the  com plexity of these 
protocol standards is often very high: rap id  changes in the capabilities of the 
underlying hardw are, the fact th a t often m any (industrial) parties are involved 
in standardization , each w ith its own interests, and m arket dem ands to  extend 
the functionality  of the  protocol. Since these standards serve as a guide to  im­
plem entors from m any different companies, w ith very different backgrounds, it 
is v ital th a t standards only allow for one clear in terpretation , are com plete and 
ensure the required functionality  for each im plem entation. For m ost protocol 
standards th is is clearly not the  case. In fact, it is surprising th a t protocols th a t 
are of such immense im portance to  our society are typically w ritten  in informal 
language, w ith frequent ambiguities, omissions and inconsistencies. They also 
fail to  s ta te  w hat properties are expected of a network running the  protocol, 
and w hat it means for an im plem entation to  conform to  a standard .
By now there is ample evidence th a t formal (m athem atical) techniques and 
tools m ay help to  improve the quality  of protocol standards. Numerous publi­
cations describe the formal m odeling and analysis of critical parts  of protocols, 
and via these case studies m any previously undetected  bugs have been detected 
(see e.g. [12, 7,15, 22, 27,18,11, 28]). In m ost cases, these studies were carried out 
after the  standard  had been com pleted and involved guessing to  fill in holes and 
resolve am biguities in the standard . An exception is the work by Rom ijn and 
her colleagues a t the Eindhoven University of Technology, who aim  a t applying 
formal m ethods already during the  standard  developm ent process. Their efforts 
have resulted, for instance, in the discovery and correction of m any errors, omis­
sions and inconsistencies, as well as the addition of correctness properties, in the 
IE E E  1394.1 F ireW ire Net U pdate stan d ard  [26].
In order to  avoid holes and am biguities in standards the  obvious way to  go 
is to  describe critical p a rts  using program m ing an d /o r formal specification lan­
guages, sim ilar to  the way in which diagram s are used to  specify the electrical 
circuits and mechanical parts. There have been jo in t a ttem p ts  of academ ia and 
industry  to  arrive a t formal description languages for protocols. The m ost no­
table a ttem p ts  a t th is have been the LOTOS and SDL standard ization  efforts. 
Interestingly — to  the best of our knowledge — these languages have never 
been used in the  au thorita tive p a rt of protocol standards. Some ISO standards 
w ritten  in the  90’s had  inform ative annexes w ritten  in a formal language such 
as LOTOS, bu t in case of ambiguity, the  inform al (natural language) p a rt had 
precedence. A pparently, s tandard ization  bodies either did not tru s t/u n d e rs ta n d  
the formal specifications themselves or were afraid im plem entors would m isinter­
3pret them . Some protocol stan d ard  have extended finite s ta te  machines (EFSM s) 
inside, bu t these are m ostly illustrative, not com pletely formal, and sometimes 
contain m istakes.3 B runs and Staskauskas [7] used C to  describe the SO N ET Au­
tom atic P ro tection  Switching (APS) protocol and report th a t developers found 
their C description easy to  understand  and superior to  th a t which appeared in 
the APS standard . The lack of abstraction  m echanisms is an obvious drawback 
of C. Bruns and Staskauskas suggest th a t abstraction  can be in troduced through 
an im plem entation relation.
The relationships between an (abstract) formal model of a protocol and the 
corresponding informal stan d ard  is typically obscure. As pointed out by [6], 
“current research seems to  take the construction of verification models more or 
less for granted, although their developm ent typically requires a coordinated in­
tegration of the  experience, intu ition  and creativ ity  of verification and dom ain 
experts. There is a great need for system atic m ethods for the  construction of 
verification models to  move on, and leave the current stage th a t can be charac­
terized as th a t of model hacking. The ad-hoc construction of verification models 
obscures the relationship between models and the system s th a t they  represent, 
and underm ines the reliability and relevance of the  verification results th a t are 
obtained.” It is our am bition to  improve th is situation. To establish the current 
state-of-the-art of formal m ethods and tools, we report in this paper on a case 
study  where we use UPPAAL to  formally model p arts  of Zeroconf, a protocol for 
dynam ic configuration of IPv4 link-local addresses th a t is defined in RFC 3927 
of the IE T F . O ur goal has been to  construct a model of Zeroconf th a t (a) is easy 
to  understand  by engineers, (b) comes as close as possible to  the informal tex t 
(for each transition  in the model there should be a corresponding piece of tex t 
in the  R FC), and (c) m ay serve as a basis for formal verification.
UPPAAL [3] is an in tegrated  tool environm ent for specification, validation and 
verification of real tim e system s modeled as networks of tim ed au tom ata  [2]. 
The tool is available for free for non-profit applications a t www.uppaal.com . The 
language for the new version UPPAAL 3.6 features a subset of the  C program ­
ming language, a graphical user interface for specifying networks of EFSM s, and 
tim ed au tom ata  syntax for specifying tim ing constrain ts between events. Due 
to  these extensions, the  UPPAAL syntax appears to  be sufficiently expressive for 
the description of critical parts  of protocol specifications:
1. The graphical syntax  for EFSM s in com bination w ith the C-like syntax are 
easy to  understand  for protocol designers and im plem enters, and very close 
to  notations they  use anyway.
2. UPPAAL allows one to  specify tim ing constrain ts between events, which is 
quite im portan t in m any protocol specifications.
3. The UPPAAL language does have formal sem antics and the transitions pro­
vide a simple abstraction  m echanism  for the C-like syntax: the sem antics of 
a program  is defined in term s of its effect on the observable sta te  variables.
4. The UPPAAL toolset supports sim ulation and model checking.
3 See, for instance, h ttp ://w w w .in r ia lp e s .f r /v a sy /P re s s /f ire w ire .h tm l.
4Zeroconf In this paper, we describe and analyze (critical p arts  of) Zeroconf 
[10], a protocol for dynam ic configuration of IPv4 link-local addresses th a t has 
been defined by the  IE T F  Network W orking G roup in RFC 3927 [9]. There 
are m any situations in which one would like to  use the In ternet Protocol for 
local com m unication, for instance in the  setting  of in home digital networks or 
to  establish com m unication between laptops. For these type of applications it 
is desirable to  have a plug-and-play network in which new hosts autom atically  
configure an IPv4 address, w ithout using external configuration servers, like 
DHCP and DNS, or requiring users to  set up each com puter by hand. The 
Zeroconf protocol has been proposed by the  IE T F  to  achieve exactly this. It 
describes how a host m ay autom atically  configure an interface w ith an IPv4 
address w ithin the 169.254/16 prefix th a t is valid for com m unication w ith other 
devices connected to  the same physical (or logical) link. The m ost widely adopted 
Zeroconf im plem entation is Bonjour from Apple C om puter4, bu t several other 
im plem entations are available.5
Contribution  The contribution  of th is paper is, first of all, a formal model of 
a critical p a rt of Zeroconf — a protocol w ith clear practical relevance — th a t 
is easy to  understand , faithful to  the  RFC, and w ith an extensive discussion of 
the relationship between the model and the RFC. O ur modeling efforts revealed 
several errors (or a t least ambiguities) in the RFC th a t no one else spo tted  
before. We also identify several directions where UPPAAL still can be improved. 
Finally, after applying several nontrivial abstractions we manage, using UPPAAL, 
to  fully explore the sta te  space of an instance of our model w ith three hosts, and 
establish some interesting correctness properties.
Related Work The Zeroconf protocol involves a num ber of probabilistic aspects 
th a t are not incorporated  in our UPPAAL model: hosts select IP-addresses ran ­
domly using a pseudo-random  num ber generator, and a t some point during the 
protocol they  wait for a random  am ount of tim e selected uniform ly from an in­
terval. The probabilistic behavior of Zeroconf has been studied in [5,20]. The 
prim ary goal of [5] was to  investigate the trade  off between reliability and effec­
tiveness of the protocol using a stochastic cost model. The model of [5], which 
only involves a single host, is quite appropriate in capturing the probabilistic be­
havior of IP  address configuration and conflict handling, bu t the  analysis takes 
place a t a level th a t is much more abstrac t then  the RFC. Based on an earlier 
version of the  present paper, a more detailed model has been presented in [20] 
using the probabilistic model checker PRISM  [21]. The model checking results 
reported  in [20] are very interesting, bu t the precise relationship between the 
model and the  RFC is unclear (for instance, in the  model of [20] address defense 
only occurs before a host is using an IP  address). O ur m otivation for using Up- 
PAAL instead of PRISM  was th a t the inpu t language of PRISM  is too  prim itive 
for our purposes (no GUI, ju s t a few datatypes, no support of C-like syntax,..).
4 See h ttp ://d ev e lo p er.ap p le .co m /n e tw o rk in g /b o n jo u r/.
See h ttp ://e n .w ik ip e d ia .o rg /w ik i/Z e ro co n f.
5A toolset th a t combines the functionality  of U ppa a l  and PRISM  would be ideal 
for dealing w ith the Zeroconf protocol.
Paper outline The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we ex­
plain the  protocol and our U p p a a l  model of it. In Section 3, a m anual proof 
of correctness of the protocol is presented. We also define an abstracted  model, 
which can be autom atically  explored in the case of 3 hosts. Finally, in Section 4 
we present our conclusions and several directions for fu ture research.
The U ppa a l  models described in th is paper are available on-line at
h t t p : / / w w w .c s . r u .n l / i t a / p u b l i c a t i o n s / p a p e r s / f v a a n / z e r o c o n f / .
2 T he P rotoco l
In th is section, we describe the  Zeroconf protocol, our U ppa a l  model of it, 
and the relationship between our model and RFC 3927 [9], the  official protocol 
standard .
A Zeroconf network is composed of a set of hosts on the  same link. Hosts in 
the Zeroconf network can be devices th a t are present a t home, office, em bedded 
system s “plugged together” as in an autom obile, or the  laptops of three friends 
who are w riting a jo in t paper and w ant to  share a file. The goal of Zeroconf is to  
enable networking in the  absence of configuration and adm inistration  services. 
The core of RFC 3927 [9] concerns the dynam ic configuration of IPv4 link-local 
addresses, and this is the  p a rt on which we will focus in this paper.
The basic idea of Zeroconf is trivial and easy to  explain. A host th a t wants 
to  configure a new IP  link-local address random ly selects an address from a 
specified range and then  broadcasts a few identical messages to  the  o ther hosts, 
seperated  by some delay, asking w hether someone is already using the  address. 
If one of the o ther hosts indicates th a t it is using the  o ther address, the host 
s ta rts  all over again. Otherwise, it m ay s ta r t using the address after waiting a 
certain  am ount of time.
One m ay view Zeroconf as a d istribu ted  m utual exclusion algorithm  in which 
the resources are IP  addresses. A goal of Zeroconf is to  prevent th a t a t any point 
two different hosts are using the same IP  address. The underlying algorithm  used 
in Zeroconf is sim ilar to  F isher’s m utual exclusion algorithm  [1, 24] and makes es­
sential use of tim ing. However, whereas F ischer’s algorithm  uses a shared variable 
for com m unication between processes, Zeroconf uses broadcast com m unication. 
W ithin  Zeroconf, hosts do not aim  a t acquiring access to  a specific critical sec­
tion (IP address); it is enough to  ob tain  access to  one of the  65024 available 
critical sections (IP addresses).
2 .1  B a s ic  M o d e llin g  A s s u m p tio n s
RFC 3927 assumes a se t  of hosts. This set is not fixed and host m ay join and 
leave while the protocol is running. Since U p p a a l  does not support dynam ic
6process creation, we assume a fixed num ber of k hosts. I t m ay take arb itra ry  
long before a host becomes active in the protocol and one m ay argue th a t in 
this way creation of new hosts is being captured. We do not model host failure 
or term ination  bu t it would be easy to  add th is .6 In our model, a host th a t 
has configured an IP  address m ay stop sending messages. From  an observational 
point of view th is is the  same as a (stopping) failure. A phenom enon th a t m ay 
occur in practice, and which we have also not modeled here, is th a t previously 
separate Zeroconf networks are joined.
The behavior of each host is modeled by three tim ed au to m ata  th a t are com­
posed in parallel: Config, InputHandler and Regular. A utom aton Config models 
the configuration of a new IP  address, InputHandler takes care of the  incoming 
messages, and Regular is an abstrac t model of the activ ity  of all the  o ther pro­
cesses running on the host. All three au to m ata  are param etrized by the hardw are 
address of the  host they  belong to. For convenience, in our model a hardw are 
address is a n a tu ra l num ber in the  range 0 to  k — 1. W ithin  U p pa a l , the  scalarset 
type sc a la r[k ] denotes the set { 0 , . . . ,  k — 1}.
typedef sca la r[k ]  HAType;
On scalarsets only restricted  operations are perm itted . As a consequence, a 
scalarset is a fully sym m etric type and the behavior of a model is invariant 
under a rb itra ry  perm utations of the elements of a scalarset [19,17]. By defining 
a scalarset type ra th e r th an  a subrange, we tell U ppa a l  th a t w ithin our model 
all the  hardw are addresses (and therefore also the  hosts) play a fully sym m etric 
role, which makes it possible to  exploit th is sym m etry  during exploration of the 
sta te  space.
As already discussed in the in troduction, our model abstrac ts from proba­
bilistic issues, and contains non determ inistic choice whenever the  RFC specifies 
probabilistic choice.
2 .2  T h e  N e tw o rk
RFC 3927 sta tes the following assum ption about the underlying network [page
4, section 1.3]:
“This specification applies to  all IE E E  802 Local Area Networks (LANs) 
[802], including E thernet [802.3], Token-Ring [802.5] and IE E E  802.11 
wireless LANs [802.11], as well as to  o ther link-layer technologies th a t 
operate a t d a ta  rates of a t least 1 Mbps, have a round-trip  latency of at 
m ost one second, and support A R P [RFC826].”
The Address Resolution Protocol (ARP, [25]) is a widely used m ethod for con­
verting protocol addresses (e.g., IP  addresses) to  local network ( “hardw are” ) 
addresses (e.g., E thernet addresses). I t allows dynam ic d istribu tion  of the in­
form ation needed to  build tables to  transla te  protocol addresses to  hardw are
6 Notationally it would be somewhat cumbersome as UPPAAL still lacks a notion of 
hierarchical state.
7addresses. W ith in  Zeroconf all messages are A R P packets. For our model, the 
relevant inform ation in an A R P packet consists of (1) a sender hardw are address,
(2) a sender IP  address, (3) a ta rget IP  address, and (4) the  type of the  packet, 
which can be either “request” or “reply” . Hence, an A R P packet can be defined 
as a U ppa a l  C d a ta  type as follows:
typedef s tru c t{
HAType senderHA; / /  sender hardware address 
IPType senderIP; / /  sender IP address 
IPType ta rg e tIP ; / /  ta rg e t  IP address
bool req u est; / /  i s  the  packet a Request or a Reply 
}ARP_packet;
Here we use the  convention th a t the request field is tru e  for A R P requests and 
fa ls e  for A R P replies. A host th a t is looking for the local network address of 
another host w ith IP  address x, broadcasts an A R P request packet w ith the 
field ta rg e tIP  set to  x. A host w ith IP  address x will then  re tu rn  an A R P reply 
packet w ith the  field senderHA set to  its local network address.
In Zeroconf, all A RP packets are broadcast [page 13, section 2.5]:
“All A RP packets (*replies* as well as requests) th a t contain a Link- Lo­
cal ’sender IP  address’ M UST be sent using link-layer broadcast instead 
of link-layer unicast. This aids tim ely detection of duplicate addresses.”
We model the underlying network as a set of n identical Network au tom ata. 
Each of these au to m ata  takes care of handling a single A R P request at a time. 
To express th a t all the  au to m ata  are sym m etric, we define a type
typedef sca la r[k ]  NetworkType;
and param etrize each au tom aton  by an elem ent j  from th is type.
The m ain reason for having n au tom ata  is th a t th is allows us to  model round- 
trip  latencies in U p pa a l . Fig. 1 schem atically illustrates the  operation  of a 
Network autom aton. After a request from a host comes in (send_req), th is is 
broadcast to  all hosts (receive_msg). In case there is a corresponding answer 
(this m ay be a reply or a request packet) this is accepted (answer) and also 
broadcast to  all hosts (receive_msg). All these interactions take place w ithin 1 
second. A fter com pleting its task  the Network au tom aton  retu rns to  its initial 
location, ready to  take care of a new request.
To simplify our model, we assume th a t a host handles an incoming ARP 
request in zero tim e, i.e., we adopt the synchrony hypothesis th a t is well-known 
from synchronous program m ing [4]. A desktop com puter can realistically answer 
an A R P in 100^s. A device like a SitePlayer could take up to  10ms. Neither 
have a significant im pact on achieving a round-trip  delay under 1s. By taking 
the conceptual view th a t the 1s which Network m ay use to  do its work includes 
the  tim e needed by a host to  generate a reply, we avoid cum bersom e modeling 
of inpu t buffers a t each host.
Before explaining our U ppa a l  model of the Network au tom aton  in detail (in 
Section 2.5), we now tu rn  our a tten tion  to  the core p a rt of RFC 3927, which 
concerns address configuration.
8F ig .1. Interaction between Network automaton and hosts.
2 .3  A d d re s s  C o n f ig u ra tio n
Fig. 2 displays the au tom aton  C onfig [j], which specifies how host j configures 
a new IP  address. Each host s ta rts  in location INIT, where it resides until it has 
selected an IP  address. According to  the RFC [page 9, section 2.1]:
“W hen a host wishes to  configure an IPv4 Link-Local address, it selects 
an address using a pseudo-random  num ber generator w ith a uniform 
d istribu tion  in the  range from 169.254.1.0 to  169.254.254.255 inclusive.
The IPv4 prefix 169.254/16 is registered w ith the IANA for th is purpose.
The first 256 and last 256 addresses in the  169.254/16 prefix are reserved 
for future use and M UST N O T be selected by a host using th is dynamic 
configuration m echanism .”
Ju st to  keep the code simple, we abstrac t sligthly from the nam ing of IP  ad­
dresses. An IP  address sim ply is a num ber in the  range 0 to  m, where m denotes 
the num ber of available link-local addresses:
typedef in t[0 ,m ] IPType;
The address 0 corresponds to  the  all zeroes IP  address 0.0.0.0, which is used as a 
special ‘unknow n’ or ‘undefined’ value in the  protocol, and the addresses 1 to  m 
correspond to  the addresses registered w ith the IANA, listed in increasing order. 
Due to  the special role of the address 0, we cannot declare IPType as a (fully 
sym m etric) scalarset, and thus we declare it as a subrange instead. A transition  
from location INIT to  location WAIT takes place when an address has been selected. 
Via the U ppa a l  select s ta tem ent add ress:in t[1 ,m ] we nondeterm inistically  bind 
identifier address to  a value in the interval [1,m]. This m eans th a t there is an 
instance of the transition  for each num ber in th is interval. In th is way, we express 
th a t an IP  address is chosen nondeterm inistically. The selected address is stored 
in sta te  variable IP[j].
The RFC continues [page 11, section 2.2.1]:
9. n n rA D c  mi u/i t> t> cou n te r < A N N O U N C E _N U M  &&
coun te r<P R O B E _N U M  & &  x___A N N O U N C E  IN TE R V A L
x> =P R O B E  MIN x == A n n O U NCE_ IN IE R V A L
send ren l s en d _ req!
pacd_t.senderH A := j,
paCke!;. requeeSt::="trUe1,’ p a cnee rr+e+q uest:= tru e ’
counter+—+ x = 0
x :=0 Ljp©|,P[j1:=true
WAIT
x<=PROBE WAIT
address:in t[1 ,m ]
IP [j]:=address,
x :=0
x= =A N N O U N C E _W A IT  
counter:=0,
C onflic tN um :=0, 
x := A N N O U N C E  IN TE R V A L
PRE_CLAIM 
x<=ANNOUNCE WAIT
COLLISION
x<=RATE_LIMIT_INTERVAL
C onflic tN um  >= M A X _C O N F LIC T S  && 
x==R A T E  L IM IT  IN TE R V A L
USE
counter < ANNOUNCE_NUM imply 
x<=ANNOUNCE_INTERVAL
reset[j]?
IP [j]:=0,
U seIP [j]:= fa lse
INIT
Fig. 2 . Automaton Config.
“W hen ready to  begin probing, the  host should then  wait for a random  
tim e interval selected uniform ly in the range zero to  PROBE_W AIT sec­
onds, and should then  send PROBE_NUM  probe packets, each of these 
probe packets spaced randomly, PROBE_M IN to  PROBE_M AX seconds 
a p a rt.”
The waiting period is modeled by resetting  a local clock x upon entering location 
WAIT and by bounding the tim e the host m ay stay  in WAIT w ith an invariant x <= 
PROBE_WAIT. At any point the host m ay move to  location PROBE, where it s ta rts  
sending “probes” . The notion of an A RP Probe is specified in the  RFC as follows:
“A host probes to  see if an address is already in use by broadcasting an 
A R P Request for the  desired address. The client M UST fill in the  ‘sender 
hardw are address’ field of the A RP Request w ith the hardw are address 
of the interface th rough which it is sending the packet. The ‘sender IP 
address’ field M UST be set to  all zeroes, to  avoid polluting A R P caches 
in o ther hosts on the same link in the case where the  address tu rns out 
to  be already in use by another host. The ‘target hardw are address’ field 
is ignored and SHOULD be set to  all zeroes. The ‘target IP  address’ field 
M UST be set to  the address being probed. An A R P Request constructed 
th is way w ith an all-zero ‘sender IP  address’ is referred to  as an ” ARP 
P robe” .”
10
Sending A R P Probes is modeled via actions send_req[j]! th a t synchronize with 
the network. The actual packet is com m unicated via a global shared variable 
packet of type ARP_packet: in U ppa a l  the  assignm ents in an ou tp u t (!) transi­
tion are executed before the assignm ents in a synchronizing inpu t (?) transition, 
and th is allows us to  assign a value to  packet in a send_req[j]! transition , which 
is then  picked up by a corresponding send_req[j]? transition  by a Network au­
tom aton. The lower and upper bounds of the  probe interval are expressed in our 
model w ith a guard x >= PROBE_MIN on the  sending transition  and an invariant 
x <= PROBE_MAX on location PROBE, respectively. By setting  x to  PROBE_MAX in the 
transition  from WAIT to  PROBE, we express th a t the first probe is sent immediately. 
A local variable c o u n te r  is used to  record the num ber of probes th a t have been 
sent. After the probing phase is successfully com pleted, the  au tom aton  jum ps 
to  location PRE_CLAIM. The urgent broadcast channel urg ensures th a t th is tra n ­
sition is taken as soon as it is enabled. As the reader can check, the  translation  
from the RFC description of the probing phase to  U ppa a l  is straightforw ard. 
According to  the RFC:
“If, by ANNOUNCE_W AIT seconds after the  transm ission of the  last 
A R P Probe no conflicting A R P Reply or A R P Probe has been received, 
then  the  host has successfully claimed the desired IPv4 Link-Local ad­
dress.”
Clock x is used to  ensure th a t exactly ANNOUNCE_WAIT tim e units are spent in 
location PRE_CLAIM. A transition  from location PRE_CLAIM to  location USE is taken 
to  indicate th a t the  host has successfully claimed an address.
In our model, au tom aton  InputH andler[j] (which will be explained in Sec­
tion 2.4) takes care of handling incoming messages. If InputH andler[j] decides 
th a t, due to  some conflict, a new address m ust be configured, it sends a r e s e t [ j ]  
signal to  au tom aton  C onfig [j]. Upon receiving th is signal, C onfig[j] sets IP [ j]  
to  0 and jum ps to  location COLLISION. According to  the  RFC:
“A host should m aintain  a counter of the num ber of address conflicts it 
has experienced in the process of try ing to  acquire an address, and if the 
num ber of conflicts exceeds M AX_CONFLICTS then  the  host MUST 
lim it the ra te  a t which it probes for new addresses to  no more th an  one 
new address per RATE_LIM ITJNTERVAL. This is to  prevent catas­
trophic A R P storm s in pathological failure cases, such as a rogue host 
th a t answers all A RP Probes, causing legitim ate hosts to  go into an 
infinite loop attem pting  to  select a usable address.”
A counter ConflictNum is used in our model to  record the num ber of conflicts th a t 
have occurred during the process of acquiring an IP  address. Depending on the 
value of ConflictNum, the  au tom aton  retu rns to  location INIT im m ediately or first 
waits for RATE_LIMIT_INTERVAL tim e units. Again, the  correspondence between the 
RFC tex t and our U ppa a l  model is straightforw ard.
In location USE the host announces the new address th a t it has ju s t claimed 
[page 12, section 2.4]:
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“Having probed to  determ ine a unique address to  use, the  host MUST 
then  announce its claim ed address by broadcasting ANNOUNCE_NUM 
A R P announcem ents, spaced A N N O U N CEJN TERV A L seconds apart.
An A RP announcem ent is identical to  the A R P Probe described above, 
except th a t now the sender and ta rg e t IP  addresses are bo th  set to  the 
h o st’s newly selected IPv4 address. The purpose of these A R P announce­
m ents is to  make sure th a t o ther hosts on the link do not have stale A RP 
cache entries left over from some other host th a t m ay previously have 
been using the same address.”
The RFC does not specify upper and lower bounds on the tim e th a t m ay elapse 
between sending the last A RP Probe and sending the  first A R P Announcem ent. 
However, according to  the  protocol designers upper and lower bound bo th  equal 
ANNOUNCE_WAIT [8]. Also, the  RFC does not specify w hether a host m ay imme­
diately  s ta rt using a newly claimed address (in parallel w ith sending the ARP 
Announcem ents), or w hether it should first send out all announcem ents. Ac­
cording to  the designers, a host should send the first A RP Announcem ent, and 
then  it can im m ediately s ta r t using the  address [8]. So the second announcem ent 
goes out ANNOUNCE_INTERVAL seconds later, bu t o ther traffic does not need to  be 
held up waiting for th a t. Finally, the RFC does not specify the tolerance th a t 
is perm itted  on the tim ing of A RP A nnouncem ents. Since no physical device 
can consistently send messages spaced exactly ANNOUNCE_INTERVAL seconds apart, 
stric tly  speaking it is impossible for an im plem entation to  conform to  the RFC. 
According to  the designers, the RFC does not specify accuracy requirem ents, 
p artly  because the protocol is robust to  a wide range of variations, so it does 
not m a tte r [8]. We decided to  follow the RFC and not specify accuracy require­
m ents, bu t if someone w ants to  use our model for autom atic generation of tests, 
for instance using the U PPA A L-TRO N  toolset [23], he or she will have to  modify 
our model a t this point.
W ith  th is additional inform ation, the  m odeling of the announcem ent phase 
in U ppa a l  is straightforw ard and analogous to  th a t of the probing phase. After 
sending the  first announcem ent, Boolean variable U seIP[j] is set to  tru e . This 
enables au tom aton  R egu lar[j], displayed in Fig. 3, to  s ta r t sending out regular 
ARP requests packets w ith the senderIP field set to  IP [ j]  and the ta rg e tIP  field 
set to  an a rb itra ry  link-local address. However, even when a host is using an IP  
address still a t any m om ent a conflict m ay arise. W hen this happens autom aton  
C onfig[j] re tu rns to  its initial location and U seIP[j] is set to  f a ls e  again.
2 .4  I n p u t  H a n d le r
A utom aton InputH andler[j] receives incoming A R P packets and decides w hat to  
do w ith them . Inpu t handling is described at various places in RFC 3937, which 
makes it nontrivial to  determ ine the reaction to  an a rb itra ry  A RP packet, also 
because Zeroconf runs on top  of the A RP protocol, which it sometimes follows 
bu t sometimes overrules. A utom aton InputHandler is displayed in Fig. 4. W hen 
a new packet arrives, th a t is, when a receive_m sg[j]? transition  occurs, the au­
tom aton  calls a function ih an d le r to  find out w hat to  do. This function com putes
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address:int[1,m]
UseIP[j]
send_req!
packet.senderHA:=j,
packet.senderIP:=lP[j],
packet.targetIP:=address,
packet.request:=true
Fig. 3. Automation RegularEj].
response==true
answer!
packet.targetIP:=packet.senderIP
packet.senderHA:=j,
packet.senderIP:=IP[j],
packet.request:=false
y:=DEFEND_INTERVAL + 1
response==true
answer!
packet.senderHA:=j,
packet.senderIP:=IP[j],
packet.targetIP:=IP[j],
packet.request:=true,
y:=0
conflict==false conflict==true
(c)
Fig. 4. Automaton InputHandlerEj] .
two bits, c o n f l ic t  and response: if co n flic t= = tru e  then  some other host is using 
or try ing  to  use the IP  address the host has selected and if response==true then 
a packet will be send in response. Thus the value of the two b its determ ines the 
reaction of the  input handler to  the incoming packet:
1. If co n flic t= = tru e  and response==false, a r e s e t [ j ]  signal is sent.
2. If co n flic t= = tru e  and response==true, an A R P Announcem ent is broadcast.
3. If c o n flic t= = fa lse  and response==true, an A R P Reply is broadcast.
4. If c o n flic t= = fa lse  and response==false, the  packet is ignored.
The definition of ihand ler is listed in Fig. 5. Function ihand le r has a param eter 
defend which m ay be either f a ls e  or tru e . This param eter, which indicates th a t 
a host will defend its IP  address in case of a conflicting A R P request, m ay be 
tru e  only if there has been no other conflict during the last DEFEND_INTERVAL tim e 
units. Clock y is used to  m easure the tim e since the last conflict. A ltogether, the 
input handler has to  distinguish 9 scenarios.
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void ihandler(bool defend)
{
if (IP[j]==0) // Scenario A: I have not selected an IP address 
{response:=false; conflict:=false;} 
else if (packet.senderHA==j) // Scenario B: I have sent the packet myself 
{response:=false; conflict:=false;} 
else if (packet.senderIP==IP[j]) //There is a conflict: somebody else is using my IP address!
conflict:=true;
if (not UseIP[j]) // Scenario C: select a new address 
response:=false;
else if (defend) // Scenario D: I am going to defend my address 
response:=true; 
else // Scenario E: I will not defend my address 
response:=false;
}
else if (not UseIP[j]) 
response:=false;
if (packet.targetIP==IP[j] && packet.request && packet.senderIP==0) // Scenario F: conflicting probe 
conflict:=true;
else //Scenario G: Packet is not conflicting with IP address that I want to use 
conflict:=false;
}
else // Incoming packet is not conflicting with IP address that I am using 
conflict:=false;
if (packet.targetIP==IP[j] && packet.request) // Scenario H: answer regular ARP request 
response:=true; 
else // Scenario I: no reply message required 
response:=false;
}
}
Fig. 5. Function ihandler.
Scenario A .  Clearly, if a packet comes in when a host has not yet selected an 
IP  address it should be ignored. This scenario is not listed explicitly in the RFC 
bu t should be obvious.
Scenario B .  Packets th a t a host has sent itself can be ignored. Also th is scenario 
is im plicit in the RFC.
Scenario C .  A conflict m ay arise when another host sends a packet w ith the 
senderIP field set to  IP [ j] .  This occurs in Scenario C, which is described on 
[page 11, section 2.2.1]:
“If during th is period, from the beginning of the probing process until 
ANNOUNCE_W AIT seconds after the last probe packet is sent, the  host 
receives any A RP packet (Request *or* Reply) on the interface where 
the probe is being perform ed where the packet’s ‘sender IP  address’ is 
the address being probed for, then  the host M UST trea t this address as 
being in use by some other host, and M UST select a new pseudo-random  
address and repeat the process.”
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Scenarios D and E. In the  previous scenario, U seIP[j]==false. The case w ith 
U seIP[j]==true is also described in the  RFC [page 12, section 2.5]:
“Address conflict detection is not lim ited to  the  address selection phase, 
when a host is sending A R P Probes. Address conflict detection is an on­
going process th a t is in effect for as long as a host is using an IPv4 
Link-Local address. At any tim e, if a host receives an A RP packet (re­
quest *or* reply) on an interface where the ‘sender IP  address’ is the IP 
address the host has configured for th a t interface, bu t the ‘sender hard ­
ware address’ does not m atch the  hardw are address of th a t interface, 
then  this is a conflicting A RP packet, indicating an address conflict.
A host M UST respond to  a conflicting A R P packet as described in either 
(a) or (b) below:
(a) Upon receiving a conflicting A RP packet, a host MAY elect to  im­
m ediately configure a new IPv4 Link-Local address as described above, 
or
(b) If a host currently  has active T C P  connections or o ther reasons to 
prefer to  keep the same IPv4 address, and it has not seen any other 
conflicting A RP packets w ithin the last D EFEN D  JN TER V A L seconds, 
then  it MAY elect to  a ttem p t to  defend its address by recording the  tim e 
th a t the  conflicting A R P packet was received, and then  broadcasting one 
single A RP Announcem ent, giving its own IP  and hardw are addresses 
as the  sender addresses of the  ARP. Having done this, the  host can then 
continue to  use the address norm ally w ithout any further special action. 
However, if this is not the  first conflicting A R P packet the host has seen, 
and the tim e recorded for the  previous conflicting A RP packet is recent, 
w ithin D EFEN D  JN TERV A L seconds, then  the host M UST im m ediately 
cease using th is address and configure a new IPv4 Link-Local address 
as described above. This is necessary to  ensure th a t two hosts do not 
get stuck in an endless loop w ith b o th  hosts try ing to  defend the same 
address.
A host M UST respond to  conflicting A R P packets as described in either 
(a) or (b) above. A host M UST N O T ignore conflicting A R P packets.”
Case (a) corresponds to  our scenario E. This scenario occurs when the  right 
receive_msg? transition  in the au tom aton  is taken, which sets defend to  fa lse , 
Case (b) corresponds to  scenario D. This scenario occurs when the left receive_msg? 
transition  is taken, which sets defend to  tru e .
The in terp re ta tion  of the  sentence “and it has not seen any other conflicting 
ARP packets w ithin the last DEFEND_INTERVAL seconds” in the previous 
quotation  from the  RFC is not entirely  clear. Is a host allowed to  defend its 
address if there has been a recent conflict concerning a different address (but no 
previous conflict concerning the current address)? S tric tly  speaking, the host has 
seen a conflicting packet and it m ay not defend. However, the conflict concerned a 
different address, and the m otivation for recording the  tim e since the  last conflict 
has been to  rule out a scenario in which two hosts get stuck in an endless loop 
try ing to  defend the  same addess. Thus one could also argue th a t in th is situation
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a host m ay defend its address. To model th is in terpretation , one would have to  
add an assignm ent y := DEFEND_INTERVAL+1 to  the  reset transition  of the  input 
handler.
Scenarios F  and G. The RFC specifies one more conflict scenario [page 11, 
section 2.2.1]:
“In addition, if during th is period [from the beginning of the  probing 
process until ANNOUNCE_W AIT seconds after the  last probe packet 
is sent] the  host receives any A R P Probe where the packet’s ‘ta rget 
IP  address’ is the address being probed for, and the packet’s ‘sender 
hardw are address’ is not the hardw are address of the interface the  host 
is a ttem pting  to  configure, then  the host M UST sim ilarly tre a t th is as 
an address conflict and select a new address as above. This can occur 
if two (or more) hosts a ttem p t to  configure the same IPv4 Link-Local 
address a t the same tim e.”
In the ih an d ler code, th is corresponds to  scenario F. Scenario G, which is implicit 
in the  RFC, occurs when the  incoming packet is not conflicting and the host is 
not yet using an IP  address. In th is case the incoming packet is ignored.
Scenario H  and I. The Address Resolution Protocol (RFC 826) [25] specifies 
th a t if a host receives an A R P request packet, it should re tu rn  an A R P reply 
packet if it uses an IP  address th a t equals the target protocol address of this 
request. In the reply packet the hardw are and protocol field should be swapped, 
pu ttin g  the  local hardw are and protocol addresses in the sender fields. Zeroconf 
(RFC 3927) is not explicit about conformance to  RFC 826, bu t in our model 
we take the  view th a t once a host is using an IP  address, it answers regular 
ARP requests in agreem ent w ith RFC 826 except when (a) the  request has been 
broadcast by the host itself, or (b) there is a conflict. This is scenario H in our 
model. The final Scenario I occurs when the  incoming packet is not conflicting 
w ith the IP  address th a t the host is using, and no reply packet needs to  be sent.
Note th a t in au tom aton  InputH andler[j] some of the  locations are com m itted 
(C). In U p p a a l , when a system  reaches a com m itted location, the  next transi­
tion has to  be an outgoing transition  from th a t location.7 The use of com m itted 
locations here is a modeling trick. W hen a network au tom aton  delivers a packet 
to  an input handler via a receive_msg synchronization, the input handler has 
to  re tu rn  an answer (if there is one) instantaneously  (by the synchrony hypoth­
esis). B u t since in general there are m any network au tom ata  active, we need 
to  ensure th a t the answer is picked up by the right autom aton. Introducing 
separate channel nam es for each network au tom aton  or pi-calculus like private 
channels would create too  much overhead. O ur trick is th a t a network autom aton  
m ay only synchronize on an answer action right after perform ing a receive_msg 
action. By m aking the locations of the  inpu t handler following a receive_msg
7 Or from a committed location from another component, but such a situation does 
not occur in our model.
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transition  com m itted, we ensure th a t the  reply is picked up by the right network 
autom aton. Essentially, the  receive_msg and answer synchronizations take place 
in a single atom ic transaction. In case the inpu t handler does not generate an 
answer, it uses a no_answer action to  inform the network autom aton  about this. 
This synchronization is an artifact of our model since in reality  no signal is sent 
in th is case.
2 .5  T h e  Network A u to m a to n
The Network au tom aton  is shown in Fig. 6. In itially  the au tom aton  is in its IDLE
IDLE o
send_req?
send_buffer:=packet,
z:=0
urg!
all_sent()
init_vars()
no answer?
answer?
answer_buffer:=packet
no answer?
DELIVER host:HAType 
z<=1 sent[host]==false
receive_msg[host]! 
sent[host]:=true, 
packet:=send_buffer
host:HAType
answer_buffer.senderIP!=0 && replied[host]==false 
receive_msg[host]! 
replied[host]:=true, 
packet:=answer_buffer
©
Fig. 6. The Network automaton.
location. As soon as it receives a packet from a host via send_req, it jum ps to  
the DELIVER location. Since there is no lower bound on message delivery time, 
message delivery m ay s ta r t immediately. A local clock z is reset to  zero and 
an invariant z <  1 ensures th a t w ithin 1 second the network broadcasts the 
packet (and the answer if there is one) to  all hosts. In our model we assume 
th a t there is a t m ost one host th a t w ants to  answer any given request, and 
th a t an answer does not induce subsequent answers. I t is possible to  modify the 
Network au tom aton  so th a t it can handle m ultiple and successive answers, bu t 
this requires additional s ta te  variables and more com plicated d a ta  structures. 
O ur Network autom aton  has two local buffers: send_buffer stores the  packet 
th a t was sent by the host and answer_buffer stores an answer when it arrives. 
In addition, Network m aintains Boolean arrays sen t and re p lie d  to  records to  
which hosts the  packets have already been delivered. Using the U ppa a l  select
17
statem ent, the au tom aton  non determ inistically  selects in which order a packet 
is delivered to  the different hosts. A host m ay re tu rn  an answer upon receipt 
of a request, as explained in Subsection 2.4. The lower transition  labeled with 
receive_msg is enabled as soon as there is an answer packet in answer_buffer. 
The network re tu rns to  its IDLE location and resets its buffers, as soon as all 
messages have been sent. This is checked by the Boolean function all_sen t:
bool a ll_ se n t( ){
/ /  the  request packet has been sen t to  a l l  
/ /  and i f  th e re  i s  an answer i t  has been sen t to  a l l  
re tu rn  ( ( f o r a l l  ( i  : HAType) s e n t [ i ] )  and 
((answ er_buffer.senderIP!=0) imply 
( f o r a l l  ( i  : HAType) r e p l i e d [ i ] ) ) ) ;  }
U pon re tu rn  to  the  IDLE location all variables are re-initialized.
2 .6  D im e n s io n in g  th e  C o m p le te  M o d e l
The RFC [page 25, section 9] specifies the  following values for the  different 
tim ing constants. These definitions are copied alm ost verbatim  in the U ppa a l  
declaration section of our model.
'PROBE_WAIT 1 second (initial random delay)
PRQBE_NUM 3 (number of probe packets)
PROBE_MIN 1 second (minimum delay till repeated probe)
PROBE_MAX 2 seconds (maximum delay till repeated probe)
ANNOUNCE_WAIT 2 seconds (delay before announcing)
ANNOUNCE_NUM 2 (number of announcement packets)
ANNOUNCE_INTERV AL 2 seconds (time between announcement packets)
MAX_CONFLICTS 10 (max conflicts before rate limiting)
RATE_LIMIT_INTERVAL 60 seconds (delay between successive attempts)
DEF END_INTERVAL 10 seconds (minimum interval between defensive ARPs)
In general, a Zeroconf network has 65024 IP  addresses available and it is su it­
able for up  to  1300 hosts [9]. These values are too big for au tom atic verification 
and w ith 3 hosts and 65024 IP  addresses also the U ppa a l  sim ulator runs out of 
memory.
A next issue regarding the dim ensioning of the model is the  num ber n of 
Network au tom ata, i.e., the  m axim al num ber of A R P requests th a t m ay be in 
tran sit a t any given point. In our model, a host m ay select an IP  address, send 
a probe, and re tu rn  to  the initial location via a reset in zero tim e. In fact, th is 
behavior m ay be repeated  MAX_CONFLICTS tim es in a row in zero tim e. Once a 
host is using an IP  address, the num ber of messages in tran sit m ay increase even 
further (in fact unboundedly) since there is no lower bound on the tim e between 
successive A R P requests. U ppa a l  forces us to  bound the num ber of Network 
au tom ata  to  some num ber n.
3 V erification
The model described in Section 2 is very close to  the RFC definition of the 
protocol. However, as a result the  model is too  big for U ppa a l  to  do a complete
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sta te  space exploration for nontrivial instances, even when we use sym m etry 
reduction.
The RFC specification of the protocol does not specify w hat properties the 
protocol m ust satisfy. However, it is clear th a t a t least the  following two correct­
ness properties are desirable:8
1. M utual exclusion, i.e., no two hosts m ay use same IP  address. This can be 
specified in U ppa a l  as follows:
ME = A[] f o r a l l  ( i :  HAType) f o r a l l  ( j :  HAType)
(U seIP[i] && U seIP[j] && IP [i]= = IP [j])  imply i==j
2. The network has no deadlock, i.e, in each reachable s ta te  a transition  is 
possible. Or in U ppa a l  syntax:
DL = A[] not deadlock
Using the la test version of U ppa a l  (3.6 beta), we only m anaged to  establish 
ME and DL for the instance w ith 2 hosts, 1 IP  address and 2 network au tom ata. 
Nevertheless, it is ra ther obvious th a t Zeroconf satisfies the m utual exclusion 
property  and is free of deadlocks. In the rem ainder of th is section, we first present 
a sketch of a m anual proof of m utual exclusion and then  describe an abstracted  
version of our model th a t can be fully explored by U ppa a l  in the case of 3 hosts 
and used to  prove m utual exclusion autom atically  for this instance. We claim 
th a t the full model has no deadlocks bu t do not present the (long and tedious) 
proof here. Since the abstrac t model overapproxim ates the full model, absence 
of deadlock in the  first does not im ply absence of deadlock in the  second.
3.1  M a n u a l  P r o o f  o f  M u tu a l  E x c lu s io n
T h e o re m  1. For each instance o f our Zeroconf model (i.e., any number o f IP  
addresses, any number o f hosts, and any number o f network automata), the m u­
tual exclusion property ME holds.
Proof. (Sketch) Suppose i  and j are hardw are addresses w ith i  != j ,  and sup­
pose th a t in some reachable s ta te  s, U seIP[i], U seIP[j] and I P [ i ]= IP [ j ] . We 
derive a contradiction. Consider an execution a  leading up to  s ta te  s, i.e., a 
finite sequence of delay and action transitions in the  sem antics of the  model 
leading from the s ta r t s ta te  to  s. W ithou t loss of generality, we m ay assume 
th a t host j enters the  critical section before (but possibly a t the  same tim e as)
i. Observe th a t before a host enters the “critical section” (where it uses an IP  
address) it resides at least 6 tim e units in the  “try ing region” (where it has se­
lected an IP  address bu t is not yet using it). Formally, the try ing  region of host 
i  is characterized by the predicate
8 Mutual exclusion will not hold in an extension of our model in which Zeroconf 
networks can be merged. In such an extension the specification should be weakened: 
mutual exclusion may be violated after a join, but as soon as the violation is detected 
(due to an ARP packet) mutual exclusion will be restored within a specified amount 
of time (provided meanwhile no further joins occur).
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C onfig(i).W A IT  | |  C onfig(i).PR O B E  | |  Config(i).PRE_CLAIM  | |  
(C o n fig (i) .U S E  && C o n f ig ( i) .c o u n te r= = 0 )
and the critical section by
C o n fig (i) .U S E  && C o n f ig ( i ) .c o u n te r> 0
Moreover, exactly 2 tim e units before entering the critical section, a host sends 
a (in fact, the  last) probe packet.
Assume th a t host i  is in its critical section from tim e t0  onwards, and is in 
its try ing  region from tim e t1 to  t0. Similarly, host j is in its critical section from 
tim e u0 onwards, and is in its try ing  region from tim e u1 to  u0. Let t  be the 
tim e a t which host i  sends its last probe and let u be the tim e a t which this 
probe is received by the inpu t handler of host j .  T hen we have the following 
(in)equalities:
t0 IV e o
t o IV 6+1t
0u IV 6+1u
t = t o — 2
u IV t
t IV 1—u
We consider two cases:
1. See Figure 7. The last probe arrives a t host j before it enters the  critical 
section. Then j m ust be in its try ing region since:
u >  t  =  t0  — 2 >  u0 — 2 > u 0  — 6 >  u1.
B ut th is m eans th a t host j ’s input handler, upon receipt of the conflicting 
probe, will generate a reset (Scenario F) and drive C onfig(j) back to  its 
initial s ta te , i.e, out of the try ing region. C ontradication.
2. See Figure 8. The last probe arrives a t host j after it enters the critical 
section. B u t th is m eans th a t host j ’s inpu t handler, upon receipt of the 
probe, will re tu rn  a reply message (Scenario H). Since we assume a roundtrip  
delay of a t m ost 1 tim e unit, th is reply message will arrive at i  a t some tim e 
t '  w ith t '  < t  +  1. At tim e t '  host i  is still in its trying region since
t0 =  t  +  2 >  t  +  1 >  t '  >  t  =  t0  — 2 >  t0  — 6 >  t1.
Hence, the  inpu t handler will generate a reset upon receipt of th is reply 
message (Scenario C) and drive C onfig(i) back to  its initial state, i.e, out of 
its try ing region. C ontradication. QED
Form alization/m echanization of the proof of Theorem  1, for instance in PVS 
using the basic setup of [28], should be a routine exercise.
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Host i Host j
u1
t1
t0
__________u
Iu0
Fig. 7. Last probe arrives at j before it enters critical section.
Host i Host j
u1
t1
t0
t
u0
Fig. 8. Last probe arrives at j after it enters critical section.
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Inspection of the proof indicates th a t Zeroconf is extrem ly robust: the  proto­
col has been designed to  handle all kinds of error scenarios (loss of messages, fail­
ure of hosts, merge of networks) which do not occur w ithin our idealized model. 
W ithou t these errors, it suffices (for m utual exclusion) to  send out a single probe 
(PROBE_NUM=i), there is no need for sending announcem ents (ANNCIUNCE_NUM=0), and 
a host m ay s ta rt using an address after waiting any tim e longer th an  the m ax­
imal com m unication delay. For a model of this simplified protocol w ith 3 hosts 
U ppa a l  can verify ME and DE in a few seconds on a standard  PC.
3 .2  A b s t r a c t io n s
To make au tom atic verification of m utual exclusion possible for the  full protocol 
in the  case w ith 3 hosts, we applied a com bination of several abstractions (on 
top  of the  abstractions th a t are already applied by U ppa a l ). Also, we had  to  
make the additional assum ption th a t a t any tim e for each host there is a t most 
one outgoing message in transit. This allows us to  associate a single network 
autom aton  to  each host, which only accepts packets from this host when empty.
D e a d  V a r ia b le  R e d u c t io n  Dead variable reduction is a well known static  
analysis technique, th a t has for instance been studied in the  PhD  thesis of Yorav 
[29]. In Yorav’s terminology, a variable v is used in a transition  if it appears in 
the guard or in the right hand  side of an assignm ent. Variable v is defined in 
a transition  if it is in the  left hand  side of an assignm ent. Notice th a t in an 
assignm ent v :=  v +  1, v is first used, and then  it is defined. A variable v is said 
to  be dead a t a location l if on every execution p a th  from l, v is defined before it is 
used, or is never used a t all. Clearly, system s th a t only differ in the values of dead 
variables are equivalent in a very strong sense (bisimilar). In our Zeroconf model, 
variable counter of C onfig(j) is dead in locations COLLISSION and INIT. Hence, 
setting  counter:=0 upon occurrence of a reset transition  will not affect w hether 
the ME property  holds or not. A nother exam ple are the  variable c o n f lic t  and 
response, which are dead in the non-urgent locations of In p u tH an d ler(j), and 
can be reset to  f a ls e  upon entering these locations. Finally, variable packet is 
only used w ithin synchronization transitions and it can be set to  a default value 
following each transition .
O v e ra p p ro x im a t io n  By weakening guards or by m aking an urgent channel 
non-urgent, we add behavior to  an autom aton. If we m anage to  prove an invariant 
for the larger ( “overapproxim ated” ) au tom aton  it will certainly hold for the 
smaller, original autom aton. If, as a result of weakening, a variable is tested  in 
none of the transitions and it also does not occur in the  invariant th a t we are 
try ing to  prove, it can be safely om itted  from the model. In the case of Zeroconf, 
overapproxim ation and subsequent variable elim ination can be applied in the 
following two situations:
1. We m ay weaken the guards of the two transitions from COLLISION to  INIT 
in C onfig(j) to  tru e , and remove the  transition  label urg!. In the resulting
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model local variable ConflictNum is no longer used and so we can abstrac t it 
away.
2. We m ay weaken the guard  of the left receive_m sg[j]? transition  in autom a­
ton  InputH andler(j) to  tru e . In the resulting model local clock y is no longer 
used and it can be abstracted  away.
3. Once a host s ta rts  to  use the claimed IP  address (after the  first announce­
m ent), the  rem aining announcem ents can be seen as A R P packets sent by 
au tom aton  Regular.
The basic idea behind abstractions (1) and (2) is th a t Zeroconf ensures m utual 
exclusion even when a host is allowed to  always im m ediately select a new IP  
address after a reset, and m ay always defend the IP  address th a t it is using.
V e r if ic a tio n  R e s u l ts  Using the com bination of the above abstractions, we were 
able to  prove m utual exclusion for instances of Zeroconf w ith 2 hosts and up to  
5 IP  addresses, and an instance w ith 3 hosts and 1 IP  address.
We also did some experim ents w ith the use of sym m etry  reduction for IP  ad­
dresses. Since in Zeroconf the  IP  address 0 (i.e., 0.0.0.0) plays a special role, and 
U p p a a l  can only handle fully sym m etric d a ta  types, th is required some rew rit­
ing of the model. Using sym m etry reduction for IP  addresses, we were able to  
establish m utual exclusion for a system  w ith 2 hosts and an arbitrary num ber of 
IP  addresses. Essentially, th is is due to  a theorem  of Ip and Dill [19] on data sat­
uration. This theorem  (which was proved in the  setting  of M urphi bu t can easily 
be shown to  carry over to  U p p a a l)  sta tes th a t for certain  ( “d a ta ” ) scalarsets, 
the  sta te  graph does not grow any further once the size of the scalarsets grows 
beyond the num ber of scalarset locations in the system. In the case of 2 hosts, 
the num ber of scalarset locations for IP  addresses in the model equals 12 (1 for 
each C onfig[j] autom aton, 4 for each Network autom aton, and 2 for the  packet 
variable). In fact, d a ta  sa tu ra tion  already happens sta rtin g  from scalarsets of 
size 5.
Actually, we conjecture th a t there exists a bisim ulation between a model w ith 
n  IP  addresses, for any n, and the model w ith ju s t one (nonzero) IP  address, via 
which a proof of ME for the general model can be reduced to  a proof of ME for 
the model w ith ju s t one address.
4 C onclusions
O ur goal has been to  construct a model of Zeroconf th a t (a) is easy to  understand  
by engineers, (b) comes as close as possible to  RFC 3927, and (c) m ay serve as 
a basis for formal verification. Did we succeed?
Understandability Of course, it is not to  us to  judge w hether our model is un­
derstandable for others. The present paper aims to  place the cards on the table 
as a basis for a discussion. The U p p a a l  syntax, which combines extended finite 
sta te  machines, C-like syntax  and concepts from tim ed au tom ata, will certainly
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be familiar to  protocol engineers, except m aybe for the use of clock variables. 
However, our experience is th a t tim ed au tom ata  no tation  is easy to  explain, also 
to  people w ithout expertise in theoretical com puter science. Clocks provide a 
simple and intuitive m eans to  specify the various tim ing constrain ts in Zero- 
conf. The au to m ata  Config and InputHandler would be the obvious candidates 
for inclusion in a standard . The only elem ents in these au tom ata  which m ay be 
considered less intuitive are the  use of com m itted locations in the InputHandler 
and the sending of a no_reply signal in situations where no reply packet is sent 
(this is an artifact of the model since in reality  there is no such signal). However, 
we can easily remove these elem ents from the InputHandler au tom aton  a t the 
price of m aking the Network au to m ata  (considerably) more com plicated.
There are a num ber of extensions of the  U ppa a l  syntax th a t would help us 
to  further improve the readability  of our model:
— A richer syntax for datatypes, for instance perm itting  us to  w rite 0.0.0.0 for 
the all zero IP  address instead of 0.
— The ability to  initialize clock variables, allowing us to  elim inate the initial 
transition  in the InputH andler[j] autom aton.
— The ability  to  test the value of clocks w ithin the body of functions, allowing 
us to  move the  test y>DEFEND_interval into the definition of ihand ler, where 
it belongs conceptually.
— The in troduction  of urgent transitions in U pp a a l , as advocated in [16]. This 
would allow us to  elim inate the urgent channel urg, which is a modeling 
trick th a t is hard  to  explain to  non-specialists. Also, it would allow us to  
replace the invariant counter < ANNOUNCE_NUM imply x <= ANNOUNCE_INTERVAL 
in autom aton  Config by an urgency predicate x <= ANNOUNCE .INTERVAL. In 
our opinion urgency predicates are more intuitive th an  location invariants.
Once these extensions have been im plem ented, a good case can be m ade for 
inclusion of the  Config and InputHandler au tom ata  (with the ihand le r code) 
in a Zeroconf standard . These models definitely help to  clarify the RFC and 
to  prevent incorrect in terp reta tions due to  am biguity in the  tex tua l part. The 
U ppa a l  sim ulator is also very useful to  ob tain  insight in the operation  of the 
protocol.
O ur m odeling efforts revealed five places where RFC 3927 [9] is incom­
plete/unclear:
1. I t does not specify upper and lower bounds on the tim e th a t m ay elapse 
between sending the last A RP Probe and sending the  first A R P Announce­
m ent.
2. I t does not specify w hether a host m ay im m ediately s ta r t using a newly 
claimed address or w hether it should first send out all A R P Announcem ents.
3. I t does not specify the tolerance th a t is perm itted  on the tim ing of ARP 
A nnouncem ents.
4. A lthough it sta tes th a t Zeroconf requires an underlying network th a t sup­
ports A RP (RFC 826), we identified some cases where Zeroconf does not 
conform to  RFC 826.
5. I t is not exactly clear in which situations a host m ay defend its address.
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Faithfulness and Traceability We have shown th a t U p p a a l  is able to  model Ze- 
roconf faithfully. Basically, for each transition  in the  model we can point towards 
a corresponding piece of tex t in the  RFC. The relationships between our model 
and the RFC have been described in great detail in th is paper, including the 
design choices and abstractions th a t we made. Following [6], our aim  has been 
to  make the  model construction transparent, so th a t our model m ay be more 
easily understood and checked by others, m aking its quality  m easurable in (at 
least) an inform al sense.
We see a t least three ways in which U ppa a l  can be im proved to  allow for 
even more faithful/realistic  m odeling of Zeroconf and b e tte r traceability:
— Zeroconf involves a num ber of probabilistic aspects th a t are not incorporated 
in our U ppa a l  model. An extension w ith probabilities, along the lines of 
PRISM  [21], is clearly desirable.
— U p p a a l  supports modeling of system s th a t are described as networks of a 
fixed  num ber of au tom ata  w ith a fixed  com m unication structure . This m od­
eling approach, although very convenient as a sta rtin g  point for verification, 
does not fit very well w ith the highly dynam ic s tructu re  of Zeroconf networks 
where hosts m ay join and leave, subnetworks m ay be joined, etc.
— To support traceability  it would help to  add a feature to  U ppa a l  by which 
com m ents are displayed when a user clicks on (or points at) a transition.
The first two item s require a m ajor research effort, whereas the  last item  should 
be easy to  implement.
Complexity and Tractability The formal model of Zeroconf th a t we presented in 
Section 2 cannot be analyzed by U p p a a l  for interesting instances w ith 3 or more 
hosts. We presented a simple m anual proof of m utual exclusion for the  model 
th a t we considered in th is paper (no message loss, host failure and m erging of 
networks). In order to  verify a system  w ith 3 hosts, we had to  apply some drastic 
abstractions. We have argued inform ally th a t these abstractions are sound.
A challenging question for us is to  come up w ith (autom atically  generated) 
additional abstractions th a t allow for the  au tom ated  analysis of larger instances 
of the protocol. One possibility here would be to  try  to  apply the technique 
of counterexam ple guided abstraction  refinement [14,13]. A basic idea in the 
design of Zeroconf is th a t it does not harm  to  send additional A R P messages; 
they  have only been added because they  m ay help to  ensure (or restore) m utual 
exclusion in the case of faults. Thus far, we have not been able to  come up with 
abstractions th a t cap ture  th is idea.
In our view, it is highly desirable to  extend U ppa a l  w ith (sem i-)autom atic 
support for proving correctness of abstractions. Only abstractions can bridge the 
gap between realistic and trac tab le  models.
Future W ork  In th is paper, we have only m odelled/analyzed a few simple in­
stances of a p a rt of Zeroconf in a restrictive setting  w ithout faulty nodes, merging 
of subnetworks, etc. So clearly, there are m any directions in which our modeling
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effort can be extended. The tim ing behavior of Zeroconf becomes really in ter­
esting when studied  w ithin a setting  in which also the probabilistic behavior 
is modelled. The perform ance analysis of Zeroconf reported  in [5, 20] has been 
carried out for an abstrac t probabilistic model of Zeroconf. A challenging ques­
tion is w hether these results also hold for a (probabilistic extension) of our more 
realistic model.
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